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Science of value
The science of value, or value science, is a creation of philosopher Robert S. Hartman, which attempts to formally elucidate value theory using both formal and symbolic logic.
==Fundamentals==
The fundamental principle, which functions as an axiom, and can be stated in symbolic logic, is that ''a thing is good insofar as it exemplifies its concept''. To put it another way, "a thing is good if it has all its descriptive properties." This means, according to Hartman, that the good thing has a name, that the name has a meaning defined by a set of properties, and that the thing possesses all of the properties in the set. A thing is bad if it does not fulfill its description. If it doesn't fulfill its definition it is terrible (awful, miserable.) A car, by definition, has brakes. A car which accelerates when the brakes are applied is an awful car, since a car by definition must have brakes. A horse, if we called it a car, would be an even worse car, with fewer of the properties of a car. The name we put on things is very important: it sets the norm for how we judge them.
He introduces three basic dimensions of value, ''systemic'', ''extrinsic'' and ''intrinsic'' for sets of properties—''perfection'' is to ''systemic value'' what ''goodness'' is to ''extrinsic value'' and what ''uniqueness'' is to ''intrinsic value''—each with their own cardinality: finite, and . In practice, the terms "good" and "bad" apply to finite sets of properties, since this is the only case where there is a ratio between the total number of desired properties and the number of such properties possessed by some object being valued. (In the case where the number of properties is countably infinite, the ''extrinsic'' dimension of value, the ''exposition'' as well as the mere definition of a specific concept is taken into consideration.)
Hartman quantifies this notion by the principle that ''each property of the thing is worth as much as each other property, depending on the level of abstraction''. 〔 ''The Structure of Value'', page 204 〕 Hence, if a thing has ''n'' properties, each of them—if on the same level of abstraction—is proportionally worth ''n''−1. . In other words, a car having brakes or having a gas cap are weighted equally so far as their value goes, so long as both are a part of one's definition of a "car." Since a gas cap is not normally a part of a car's definition, it would be given no weight. Headlights could be weighed twice, once or not at all depending on how headlights appear in the description of a car. Given a finite set of ''n'' properties, a thing is ''good'' if it is perceived to have all of the properties, ''fair'' if it has more than n/2 of them, ''average'' if n/2 of them, and ''bad'' if it has fewer than n/2.
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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